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Abstract: This article investigates whether changes occur in the national and European 
identities of the citizens from the old and new Member States following the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements. Complementary, it seeks to identify the major attitudinal determinants of 
national and European identities for the EU citizens. The analysis focuses on the 27 EU 
Member States and uses individual level data from the 2002-2009 Candidate Countries 
and Standard Eurobarometers. The descriptive statistics and multivariate quantitative 
analyses reveal that no relevant changes occur in the levels of national and European 
identities. The two types of identities coexist and are shaped at various levels. Their 
determinants appear to be quite stable over time, thus indicating no major alterations 
after the enlargement.
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Introduction1
The most recent enlargements of 2004 and 2007 meant the formal inclusion of 
approximately 90 million citizens into the European Union (EU). The inclusion of 12 
new Member States moved the EU border eastward and diminished the heavy influence 
of some Old Member States (e.g.: the Polish and Czech influence on the Lisbon Treaty). 
The macro-consequences of the enlargement were within a few years: faster circulation 
of capital throughout Europe, higher migration flows, rapid economic growth in Eastern 
Europe, and increased support for extreme right parties in many European countries. 
However, it is unclear if the enlargement coincides with changes in the attitudes of 
individuals towards their country or the EU. In this respect, this article investigates 
whether changes occurred in the national and European identities of the citizens from 
the old (EU15) and new Member States (NMS). Additionally, it focuses on determinants 
of national and European identities and their explanatory power before and after the 
enlargements. Accordingly, this analysis is driven by two interrelated research questions: 
1An earlier version of this article was presented at the international conferences Identity in the Era of Globalization 
and Europeanization (Skopje, November 2011) and The European Union and the Politicization of Europe (Vienna, 
December 2011).
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Is there a change in the identity attitudes after the enlargement? If so, how do determinants 
of identity attitudes change over time? 
To answer these questions, I focus on the 27 EU Member States and use individual 
level data from the 2002-2009 Candidate Countries (CCEB) and Standard Eurobarometers 
(EB). I use descriptive statistics and multivariate quantitative analyses to investigate 
the changes in national and European identities and their possible causes across years 
and countries. The tested explanations are density of political discussions, political 
attitudes (i.e. trust in the national institutions and EU), general retrospective attitudes (life 
satisfaction), economic variables (prospective evaluations), EU membership evaluations, 
and the left-right positioning. 
The first section conceptualizes the term of identity and scrutinizes the layers of identity 
formation. The second section formulates a few testable hypotheses to explain the levels 
of national and European identity. Next, I briefly discuss the research design and variable 
operationalization. The fourth section provides general empirical evidence and includes 
the multivariate analyses of determinants for the national and European identities in the 
old and new Member States. The conclusions summarize the main findings and elaborate 
on their implications.
Identity Formation: From National to European Identity
The concept of “identity” has contextual meanings (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 
p. 1). In its basic form, social identity is the complex of emotional and rational factors 
derived from the awareness of belonging to a group (Tajfel 1978, p. 63). This process 
implies both the positive identification with one owns’ group and the strengthening of 
particular features through a comparison with other groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). At 
individual level, identity refers to the abilities of persons to acquire and internalize values 
characterizing the group to which they belong (Festinger 1954). The development of the 
group is modeled by the sense of common identity (Smith 1995). The modern period 
projected the state as a major driving force of identities. Various theories from the field 
of nationalism studies consider identity as a social, cognitive (Turner 1981; Turner 1991) 
and elite construct (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983) or as a product of ethnic (Smith 1998) 
and cultural interactions (Hutchinson 1994). 
Defining “who we are” is a dynamic process, not static irrespective of the level of 
identity. The reasons for which individual attach loyalty to a certain group2 are constantly 
evaluated and, consequently, the belonging is redefined. This happens as the sense 
of common identity that bound the members (Smith 1995), the value and emotional 
significance attached to the membership (Tajfel 1978, p. 63; 1981) are sometimes lost. 
There are instances in which the modification is rarely possible. For example, once the 
identity is formed on the basis of experiences accumulated within specific social culture, 
the bonds can hardly be broken (Dijkink 1996). However, the key point to remember is 
that identity shifts can sometimes occur. This process is not primarily based on exclusion. 
Although Huntington’s claim (2004) according to which we can define our belonging 
2 Identity is defined as the belonging to a certain group perceived by its members as different from other groups. For 
details, see Cottam et al. (2004, 45-46). 
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to a group as soon as we know the principles we are against does not completely lack 
empirical support, it also fails to capture the reality. In order to maintain the collective/
group identity, the members have to retain particular norms, values, interests, and attitudes 
which provide a self-contained image shaping both their identity and relationships with 
other groups. 
Following Anderson’s (1983; 1991) conceptualization of the nations as “imagined 
communities”, the rise of nationalism within contemporary Europe cannot be neglected 
However, identity is not confined solely to the state, especially in Europe where the fully 
sovereign nation-state has reached an end (Habermas 1994). In this context, previous 
studies revealed two possibilities: a divergence between the national and European 
identity or a multi-stage identity formation. On the one hand, individuals consider their 
national identity as being threatened within a broader European context in which they 
interact with a multitude of cultures (McLaren 2002). As a result, they display negative 
attitudes towards the EU and thus provide solid bases for Euroskepticism. On the other 
hand, there are multiple layers of identity (Madens et al. 1996) in which the nation-
state becomes the propeller of identity formation at the European level (Jannsen 1991; 
Anderson 1998). According to the latter view, individuals often identify with several 
territorial communities simultaneously (Brewer 1993). The coexistence of national and 
European identities is thus possible; they are not opposites but heavily intertwined (Marks 
1999; van Kersbergen 2000; Haesly 2001; Brutter 2003; Risse 2003). 
The differences between the national and European identities are not limited to 
territoriality. The multiple identities interact differently with each other: some are separate 
identities (no overlap), others are cross-cutting (overlap without integration), others are 
nested (integrated), and marble cake (reciprocal influences) (Risse and Grabowski 2008, 
p. 2). Empirical evidence supports the idea that the European citizens display multiple 
identities. While there are continuous debates regarding the core common elements of 
such an identity (e.g. cultural vs. political vs. economic), there is a certain trend towards 
the European becoming a secondary identity for many citizens. Even if we consider the 
multi-layered approach and we refer to European identity as a second layer, there are a few 
relevant obstacles. First, the EU is a young community composed of old communities – 
the nation states – animated by individual strong feelings of separate belonging (Jansen in 
Boari and Gherghina 2009). Second, the European identity is built upon the national one. 
Very few characteristics shaping group identity – language, culture, historical experience, 
single economic and geographic areas, and shared necessity for security – can be 
reproduced at European level without being mediated by national layers. Consequently, 
very few people consider themselves Europeans without belonging initially to a country 
(Jacobs and Maier 1998). On a complementary key, European identity means allegiance 
to broader political values and principles such as democracy, tolerance, and transnational 
cooperation (Citrin and Sides 2004, 49). Third, the diversity of the 27 Member States 
creates a heterogeneous entity that adds a supplementary component to cognitive 
mobilization towards identity: the acceptance of other cultures (McLaren 2002). Such 
instances could fuel lower degrees of identification at European compared to national 
level. 
Earlier studies provide empirical evidence supporting the coexistence of the national 
and European sets of loyalties: recent figures from survey data illustrate how dual national 
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and European attachments increased by 10% in less than a decade starting 1992 (Citrin 
and Sides 2004, 50). Such shifts in attitudes take place even in countries known for their 
Euroskeptic traditions such as the United Kingdom. The national and European layers of 
identity are strongly interconnected in contemporary EU. The debates from 2005 in France 
and the Netherlands reveal these two different identity perspectives: the cosmopolitan 
project corresponds to the elite-level appealed to political citizenship and rights, whereas 
the national-populist project centers on social citizenship, ethnic elements, and cultural 
authenticity, emphasizing the economic and cultural threats of enlargement (Fossum and 
Menendez 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, pp. 11-12). 
Explaining Identity
One of the bases for group identity is the interaction between individuals. When the 
layer of reference is a political community – such as the nation-state or the EU – the 
complex decision making mechanisms and the sophisticated institutional arrangements 
can be understood mostly through communication and interaction. The high level 
abstraction of these processes is worsened by the inattentiveness and ignorance of people 
(Bennett 1996; Blondel et al. 1998). Accordingly, people who communicate may be 
better able to follow what happens and thus their identity will be enhanced. We expect 
intense political communicate to positively influence the level of identity (H1). 
The level of satisfaction with life can foster national and European attachments (H2). 
Such satisfaction is not limited to political or economic aspects, but it entails cultural and 
social components. Furthermore, earlier research explains how perceptions of favorable 
national and personal economic conditions positively correlate with attitudes towards the 
EU (i.e. support) in the Member States (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Anderson and 
Reichert 1996; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Tverdova and Anderson 2000). Thus, I expect 
positive assessments of the economic future to have a similar impact on the national and 
European identities (H3). 
The relationship between political trust and identity is bidirectional. Berg and 
Hjerm (2010) illustrate how national identity can shape political trust in various ways, 
differentiating between civic and ethnic types of identification. At the same time, the 
causal arrow goes in the opposite direction as the political state is the reference object 
of the national identity. This is why citizens are expected to develop a higher sense of 
belonging to a state in which they have confidence. As the political institutions of the 
central administration – Parliament and government – are the primary tools for decision 
making within a state, I expect citizens trusting them to display a higher level of national 
identification. Rohrschneider (2002) argues that citizens that trust their national institutions 
have the tendency to vest confidence in the EU institutions as they trust the stances adopted 
by the national leaders at European level. This tendency of citizens to display attitudes 
towards the EU according to their evaluation of domestic political institutions is mostly 
observed with respect to the integration process (Franklin et al., 1994; Rohrschneider 
2002). A similar logical mechanism is employed by identity formation and thus I expect 
trust in domestic political institutions to positively influences the national and European 
identities (H4). A similar argument can be developed about the trust in the EU that is 
expected to have a higher impact on the European identity than on the national one (H5).
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The benefits of EU membership can also influence positively the sense of belonging 
(H6). Benefits are not restricted only to the economic dimension, but involve in addition 
freedom of movement, access to labor markets etc. it is intuitive to expect that respondents 
who perceive their country as being part of select club of prosperous and democratic 
states to foster a higher sense of national belonging. Similarly, the perception of EU as a 
source of benefits advances identification with it. For this hypothesis, I expect a stronger 
effect for the European rather than for the national identity. Finally, left and right have 
different meanings on the political spectrum. Traditionally, a positioning to the right of 
the spectrum indicates a tendency to favor the national entity. This is the only variable for 
which I expect divergent effects of the positioning: a positioning to the right to enhance 
the national identity, whereas a positioning to the left to favor a European identity (H7). 
However, differences may occur between old and new Member States as left and right 
have a different meaning in Western and Eastern Europe. Age is used as control variable. 
Research Design
When referring to identity, the qualitative analysis is the most appropriate tool to 
examine and to explain the development over time and across countries. However, the 
quantitative analysis can help identifying general trends – the goal of this article. I use 
descriptive statistics to estimate how citizens from the EU Member States perceive who 
they are and to observe the relationships between the two levels of identity – national and 
European – across time. The analysis covers the 2002-2009 time period, i.e. two years 
before the largest enlargement from 2004 and two years after the most recent enlargement. 
The used data do not come from panel surveys that allow observing the shift in identity 
over time at the same individuals. Instead, I rely on data where different individuals are 
included in the surveys: Consequently, I cannot draw conclusions regarding the individual 
behavior. Whenever I refer to a change in the direction of national identity, I imply the 
general trend of the respondents from a specific country to position themselves more in 
this category than before. 
The individual level data come from the CCEB and EB surveys, one from each year. 
I selected those with questions about identity or related items: CCEB 2002.1, EB 57.1 
(2002), CCEB 2003.1, EB 60.1 (2003), EB 62.0 (2004), EB 64.2 (2005), EB 66.1 (2006), 
EB 69.2 (2008), and EB 71.3 (2009). The year 2007 is not included in the analysis as none 
of the surveys had questions about the European identity. These surveys are appropriate 
to map trends as they include large comparable datasets in terms of standardized 
questionnaires, sampling method, and data collection. All the “do not know“ or  “do not 
answer” responses are eliminated from the sample, being considered missing values. 
The national and European identities are operationalized through two proxies. For 
the 2002-2006 surveys, the identity is considered the answer of the respondents to the 
following question: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or 
not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY - refer to citizenship]/European?” There are four 
initial response alternatives: “very proud”, “fairly proud”, “not very proud”, and “not at 
all proud”. The variable is recoded, the categories being merged two by two: the first 
two form the national identity category, whereas the last two form the category of people 
who lack national identity. For 2008 and 2009, when the battery of questions is modified 
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and these items no longer appear in the questionnaire, I use a different proxy. The asked 
question is: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, 
to the region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (…) 
our country/Europe?”. The available answers are “very attached”, “fairly attached”, “not 
very attached”, and “not at all attached”. These are recoded into two categories, similar 
to the procedure from the 2002-2006 surveys. The proxies used for the identity variable 
are not identical. The pride of belonging to a nation is not the same thing with feeling 
attached to the same nation. However, they are functional equivalents for the purpose 
of this study. They both capture specific attitudes towards the country and Europe. The 
association coefficient between pride and attachment (run for the 2004 EB) is 0.9** 
(statistical significant at the 0.01 level). 
The density of political discussions is operationalized as the answer provided to the 
question about how often a respondent discusses politics. The responses may be 1) never, 
2) occasionally, and 3) frequently. The life satisfaction variable is operationalized as the 
answer to a question asking directly this; available responses were: 1) not at all satisfied, 
2) not very satisfied; 3) fairly satisfied, and 4) very satisfied. The prospective economy is a 
dichotomous variable assessing the expectations of respondents about the future of their 
economic situation (as answer to a question using these words). Trust in domestic political 
institutions is an index reflecting the trust people have in political parties, legislature, and 
government. It ranges from 0 (no trust) to 3 (trust in all three); trust in the EU and EU 
membership are dichotomous variable. The left-right positioning is a three scale variable 
with three values (left, centre, and right), whereas age is a four category variable. All 
variables were scaled from the smallest to the highest assessment. 
The Coexistence of National and European Identities
The logic emphasized in the theoretical framework indicates the coexistence of 
national and European identities. Two expectations are derived from those arguments: 1) 
the national identity to be stronger than the European one and 2) the dynamic of the two 
type of identities to be relatively independent. This section provides empirical evidence 
supporting both expectations. In this respect, it presents the general trends of national 
and European identity. It uses individual level data from CCEB and EB between 2002 and 
2009 and distinguishes between the old and new Member States. Figure 1 reflects the 
longitudinal evolution of national identity with similar levels in the two types of Member 
States. Approximately 90% of the European citizens display attachment to their national 
identity, slightly more in the EU15 compared to the NMS. However, following the last 
wave of enlargement, the level of national identity in the NMS exceeds that from the 
EU15. Whereas the stability of national identity appears to characterize the citizens from 
the EU15, the NMS register a continuous (although minor) increase (with one drawback 
in 2006) throughout the examined period of time. 
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Figure 1: Level of National Identity among the citizens 
from Old and New Member States
By comparing the percentages in Figures 1 and 2, we can easily notice that there are 
more respondents attaching loyalty to their country than to Europe. The European identity 
is displayed, on the average, by three quarters of respondents; there are slightly more 
individuals from NMS feeling Europeans than those from the EU15. Overall, the European 
identity gravitates around the same values, with minor oscillations cross the years. A major 
downside appeared to be in 2005 when the consequences of the Constitutional Treaty’s 
failure were visible and when some of the NMS encountered difficulties in the aftermath 
of their accession. Apparently, the year following the accession registers drawbacks with 
respect to the European identity (see 2008 in the figure). In general, two conclusions can 
be drawn. First, there are no relevant differences between the attachment to Europe of 
citizens from the old and new Member States. Although the beginning of the analyzed 
period marked a relatively high difference, by 2004 the levels were almost equal due 
to an initial decrease among the citizens of the NMS. Second, the enlargements do not 
appear to influence the levels of European identification on medium term; there are only 
short term effects (one year). 
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Figure 2: Level of National Identity among the citizens 
from Old and New Member States
One explanation for these low oscillations is the understanding attached by citizens 
to Europe. The theoretical framework emphasized the fuzzy meaning that a broader 
community like the EU can have to its citizens. Table 1 includes the different meaning 
attached by citizens to the EU in three different moment (2004, 2007, and 2009). These 
are not exclusive categories; the figures indicate the percentage of people who mentioned 
those features for the EU. The most popular meaning attached to the EU is the mobility 
of people, followed by peace. The latter is somewhat normal if we recall the theory 
mentioning that democracies do not go to war with each other. Two economic features are 
also pointed out by a relevant percentage of citizens: the Euro and economic prosperity. 
Such evidence confirms earlier findings that mentioned the support for the EU as mainly 
driven by economic and mobility factors. It is somewhat surprising that a relatively small 
percentage attaches the meaning of democracy to the EU given its positive efforts in 
Eastern Europe resulting in democratization (Pevehouse 2005: Schimmelfennig 2005; 
Gherghina 2009). Unemployment and bureaucracy are the two negative perceptions 
observable for a share between one fifth and one quarter of the European citizens.  
Overall, two general trends are visible. First, there are some differences between the 
meaning attached to the EU by citizens from the old Member States compared to the 
meaning attached by citizens from NMS. For example, peace, Euro, being stronger in 
the world and the EU as waste of money are features identified much more by citizens 
from the EU15; the citizens from NMS see more the EU in terms of economic prosperity, 
social protection, and mobility. Thus, citizens associate the EU either with features 
broader than their nation-states (the case of the EU15) or with features corresponding to 
their needs (the NMS). Second, and more important for this longitudinal investigation, 
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there are rare instances in which the meaning changes over time. Peace is one of those 
features, quite likely determined by the presence of troops belonging to some EU member 
State in Iraq or Afghanistan. Cultural diversity is another example, relevant for our case. In 
a nutshell, the stability of meanings can explain the relative stability of European identity 
across time.
Table 1: The EU Meaning for Citizens from the Old and New Member States (%)
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EU15 38 25 25 13 55 31 32 48 18 25 24 15 21 24
NMS 38 34 29 23 57 25 26 30 17 19 15 11 17 14
2007
EU15 37 21 21 11 54 28 29 46 15 26 23 13 21 21
NMS 31 27 25 14 60 23 20 28 11 14 12 9 15 9
2009
EU15 29 18 22 11 44 20 25 38 14 22 22 12 16 17
NMS 22 19 23 14 54 16 19 27 13 14 15 8 12 8
Figure 3 presents the percentages of citizens in the EU15 and NMS holding both 
identities. the levels and general trend are similar to those from the European identity. 
There are minor oscillations over time. Unlike the European identity, the dynamic of the 
citizens holding both identities differs between the EU15 and the NMS. The latter have 
a higher tendency of stability: with the exception of 2005, the percentage of citizens 
with the national and European identities is similar. Although there are visible some 
oscillations for the EU15 respondents, there are no clear connections between them and 
the enlargements. 
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Figure 3: Percentages of Citizens having both National and European Identity 
These general trends lead to three conclusions. First, consistent with previous findings, 
there is a priority of the national over the European identity: more individuals identify 
themselves as nationals rather than Europeans. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, a 
large number of respondents has both identities. Second, neither national nor European 
identities appear to be influenced by enlargement. Whenever oscillations occur, they 
appear random. The major failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the first impact of 
accession in some new joiners had only minor consequences with respect to identity. 
if the stability of national identity is not surprising, at European level one could have 
expected a different dynamic given the increased number of Member States. However, 
the empirical evidence illustrates stable identification of citizens with Europe, primarily 
due to a similar understanding of the EU across time. Third, there are no relevant 
differences in the attitudes of citizens from old and new Member States, their degrees of 
identification and trends are fairly similar.  The following section takes this discussion one 
step further; it investigates to what extent the determinants of the national and European 
identity function and change over time. 
Converging Explanations
Table 2 includes the logistic regression coefficients for national identity at three 
moments in time: two years before the largest enlargement and the years following 
the two most recent enlargements. The evidence generally supports the hypothesized 
relationships with no relevant differences between EU15 and NMS respondents. There are 
two exceptions. First, the density of political discussions has a counterproductive role in 
the case of the citizens from EU15: those respondents who discuss less politics with their 
friends attach more loyalty to their country. For NMS the relationship is weak. Second, 
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the effect of the EU membership on national identity is mixed in the EU15 countries. 
For example, in 2005 respondents who consider that the EU membership is negative are 
more likely to have national identity, whereas in 2008 the situation is reversed. The third 
best predictors for national identity are life satisfaction, trust in political institutions and 
age (older respondents are more likely to have attachments to their country). At the same 
time, the prospective economy does not perform greatly in explaining national identity. 
Similarly, the EU related factors do not perform quite well indicating that national identity 
is shaped somewhat independently from the European processes. From a longitudinal 
perspective, two observations are relevant. The explanatory potential of the statistical 
models is quite stable across time. Second, there are isolated cases (e.g. the left right 
positioning in 2008) in which the direction and statistical significance of predictors suffers 
modifications. Consequently, similarly to the general trend from Figure 1, the explanations 
are relatively stable over time indicating no major changes in the attitudes of individuals.
Table 2: Determinants of National Identity
Variables 2002 2005 2008
EU15 NMS EU15 NMS EU15 NMS
Frequency of political 
discussions
0.62** 
(0.06)
0.98 
(0.05)
0.62** 
(0.05)
1.04 
(0.08)
0.90 
(0.07)
1.14 
(0.13)
Life Satisfaction
1.52** 
(0.05)
1.77** 
(0.04)
1.37** 
(0.05)
1.60** 
(0.07)
1.19** 
(0.06)
1.46** 
(0.10)
Prospective Economy
1.08 
(0.04)
1.17** 
(0.04)
1.12* 
(0.05)
1.02 
(0.07)
1.08 
(0.07)
1.05 
(0.12)
Trust in Political Institutions
1.29** 
(0.04)
1.55** 
(0.04)
1.34** 
(0.04)
1.36** 
(0.06)
1.20** 
(0.05)
1.39** 
(0.11)
Trust in the EU
1.07 
(0.09)
1.03 
(0.08)
1.24** 
(0.08)
1.21 
(0.13)
0.96 
(0.12)
1.46* 
(0.19)
EU Membership is Good
1.08 
(0.06)
1.16** 
(0.04)
0.91* 
(0.05)
1.21* 
(0.09)
1.19* 
(0.07)
1.47** 
(0.13)
Left-Right Placement
1.51** 
(0.05)
- 1.42** 
(0.05)
1.21** 
(0.07)
1.12 
(0.06)
0.95 
(0.10)
Age
1.16** 
(0.04)
1.13** 
(0.03)
1.15** 
(0.03)
1.31** 
(0.05)
1.30** 
(0.05)
1.16 
(0.08)
Constant 1.08 0.34 2.27 0.44 2.65 1.96
Nagelkerke R2 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.06
N 8,815 6,991 10,575 6,288 10,553 6,383
Notes:  Reported coefficients are odd-ratios (standard errors in brackets).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
A similar story is told by the statistical analysis for European identity (Table 3). 
The statistical models – performing much better than for national identity – have 
similar explanatory potential over time. There is general support for the hypothesized 
relationships, two exceptions are again observable. The political discussions have an 
ambiguous role in shaping the European identity, whereas the respondents positioned 
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to the right of the political spectrum are more likely to have this type of identity in the 
EU15 countries (contrary to our expectations). The most prominent variables are those 
connected to the EU: trust in the EU and the positive evaluation of EU membership. A 
citizen having confidence in the EU or considering the EU membership as positive is on 
average two times more likely to display European identity compared to those who do not 
trusty the EU. A positive evaluation of life and the favorable economic prospects foster 
European identity to a greater extent than in the case of the national identity. Moreover, 
contrary to what observed for the national identity, younger people appear more inclined 
to display European identity; however, the likelihood is somewhat weaker. Compared 
to the coefficients in Table 2, the European identity reveals slightly more differences 
between the EU15 and NMS, but they remain quite reduced in the overall picture.
Table 3: Determinants of European Identity
Variables 2002 2005 2008
EU15 NMS EU15 NMS EU15 NMS
Frequency of political 
discussions
1.06 
(0.04)
0.96 
(0.05)
1.10* 
(0.04)
1.12* 
(0.06)
1.25** 
(0.03)
1.19** 
(0.05)
Life Satisfaction
1.36** 
(0.04)
1.64** 
(0.04)
1.22** 
(0.03)
1.27** 
(0.05)
1.12** 
(0.03)
1.35** 
(0.04)
Prospective Economy
1.12** 
(0.03)
1.19** 
(0.04)
1.16** 
(0.03)
1.04 
(0.05)
1.22** 
(0.04)
1.14** 
(0.05)
Trust in Political Institutions
1.12** 
(0.03)
1.02 
(0.03)
1.10** 
(0.02)
1.00 
(0.04)
1.12** 
(0.03)
1.02* 
(0.04)
Trust in the EU
1.99** 
(0.07)
2.95** 
(0.08)
2.24** 
(0.06)
2.16** 
(0.08)
2.07** 
(0.06)
1.74** 
(0.08)
EU Membership is Good
2.30** 
(0.04)
1.32** 
(0.04)
2.02** 
(0.03)
2.03** 
(0.06)
1.96** 
(0.04)
1.92** 
(0.05)
Left-Right Placement
0.98 
(0.04)
- 1.02 
(0.03)
1.22** 
(0.05)
0.96 
(0.03)
1.20** 
(0.04)
Age
0.97 
(0.03)
1.09** 
(0.03)
0.91** 
(0.02)
0.92* 
(0.04)
1.02 
(0.03)
0.95 
(0.03)
Constant 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12
Nagelkerke R2 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.15
N 8,494 6,702 10,478 6,447 10,523 6,358
Notes:  Reported coefficients are odd-ratios (standard errors in brackets).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
Conclusions
This article aimed to identify whether changes in the identity attitudes occurred after 
the EU enlargements from 2004 and 2007 and what elements drive these changes. The 
first major conclusion, derived from the evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2, is that 
enlargement appears to have no effect on national or European identity; no relevant 
changes occur over time in either EU15 or NMS. The visible drawback occurred for 
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European identity around the fuzzy period following the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Although more citizens identify themselves with their nation rather than with 
Europe, the European identity registers quite high and stable values. Such a stability can 
be caused by similar meanings attached to Europe by citizens over time (Table 1). The 
same holds true when analyzing the percentages of people holding both identities. The 
latter leads to a second conclusion: the national and European identities are not exclusive, 
rather complementary. However, their determinants are different. The national identity 
is primarily shaped by domestic components, whereas the European identity is related to 
the European processes. Third, the determinants of national and European identity have 
fairly similar explanatory power over time. Thus, no changes appear to be produced by 
the EU enlargement in the attitudes of the citizens.
By departing from the trends identified in this article, further studies can distinguish 
between identity components (e.g. social, cultural, political or economic) and focus on 
cross-national variation. In this respect, the meaning of identity for the EU citizens requires 
a detailed exploration to combine qualitative assessments and micro-level investigation 
focusing on the content of the self-declared belonging. Future analysis can explore the 
identity formation in the European societies and thus address the nuances arising from the 
various minority-majority relations or the nexus between national and European identity.
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